Favorite Generals

[OlafHelmsborg]

For some dark reason, many of us find military stuff fascinating. I was wondering, out of all those commanders who have led men and women in battle, who is your favorite?

 

Personally, mine has to be the great Carthaginian, Hannibal Barca, mainly for his daring march and lengthy stay in Italy against the rising power of the Roman Republic. He showed he could fight it out with the best of them, with fewer resources, and still deal out nasty blows. Who is yours, and why?

 

And please, no General Tso, this is strictly military generals... :D

Edited May 1, 2014 by OlafHelmsborg

[HeyYou]

I liked Patton. A no-nonsense, git'r'done general. He may have had his personality flaws, but, all in all, a great commander.

[Aurielius]

Scipio Africanus....he saw to the heart of the Punic Wars and did what no roman had been able to accomplish... crush Carthage once and for all which lead to Roman dominance of Europe for the next four centuries.

 

 

Sub Note: This is not a return to general debating for me, so the moderators may breathe a sigh of relief. :sweat:

[Tidus44]

Sir Arthur William Currie

[OlafHelmsborg]

Scipio Africanus....he saw to the heart of the Punic Wars and did what no roman had been able to accomplish... crush Carthage once and for all which lead to Roman dominance of Europe for the next four centuries.

 

 

 

 

To be honest, Scipio wasn't the only one to crush Carthage's armies, they'd been doing that long before his arrival in Spain, and in Sicily, Sardinia, and against Hannibal's Lieutenants in Italy. Scipio arrived at the right time, and won some impressive victories, but the war had already been dragging for almost ten years before he took over, and the political situation already stretched in Spain. Carthage's manpower by that point was already reaching dire straights, and much of it was in open rebellion against Carthage, having only recently fallen under its sway a year or two before the Second Punic War began.

 

In the words of Adrian Goldsworthy:

 

It is difficult to see what more Hannibal could have done to attain victory. We can never know how close the Romans came to conceding defeat. Perhaps a march on Rome after Cannae would have broken the Roman's nerve, but we cannot be sure of this and such a move would have been a great gamble. One major problem for the Carthaginians was that they had one superb commander with an excellent army, whilst elsewhere they had poor commanders with average armies or average commanders with poor armies. From the beginning the Romans were able to produce in considerable quantity armies which were average in quality and the skill of their commanders, giving them an advantage over all but Hannibal. As the war progressed and Roman leaders and soldiers gained experience, their superiority over the other Punic armies became even more marked.

The Fall of Carthage by Adrian Goldsworthy, p.314

 

He was brilliant though, and is my second favorite commander.

Edited May 2, 2014 by OlafHelmsborg

[Aurielius]

 

Scipio Africanus....he saw to the heart of the Punic Wars and did what no roman had been able to accomplish... crush Carthage once and for all which lead to Roman dominance of Europe for the next four centuries.

 

 

 

 

To be honest, Scipio wasn't the only one to crush Carthage's armies, they'd been doing that long before his arrival in Spain, and in Sicily, Sardinia, and against Hannibal's Lieutenants in Italy. Scipio arrived at the right time, and won some impressive victories, but the war had already been dragging for almost ten years before he took over, and the political situation already stretched in Spain. Carthage's manpower by that point was already reaching dire straights, and much of it was in open rebellion against Carthage, having only recently fallen under its sway a year or two before the Second Punic War began.

 

In the words of Adrian Goldsworthy:

 

It is difficult to see what more Hannibal could have done to attain victory. We can never know how close the Romans came to conceding defeat. Perhaps a march on Rome after Cannae would have broken the Roman's nerve, but we cannot be sure of this and such a move would have been a great gamble. One major problem for the Carthaginians was that they had one superb commander with an excellent army, whilst elsewhere they had poor commanders with average armies or average commanders with poor armies. From the beginning the Romans were able to produce in considerable quantity armies which were average in quality and the skill of their commanders, giving them an advantage over all but Hannibal. As the war progressed and Roman leaders and soldiers gained experience, their superiority over the other Punic armies became even more marked.

The Fall of Carthage by Adrian Goldsworthy, p.314

 

He was brilliant though, and is my second favorite commander.

 

A reasoned response deserves more than a quick refutation. Hannibal was an unmatched open field tactician but he lacked the grand tactical vision required to win the second Punic War. If he had followed up the battle of Cannae with the siege of Rome coupled with the destruction of the aqueducts as Aleric did in the fourth century he might have won the war. Hannibal spent sixteen years in Italy but never utilized the Carthaginian expertise in naval warfare and construction to strangle Roman logistics which also might have lead to eventual victory.

 

Hannibal much like Robert E Lee was a brilliant battlefield commander both of which almost never lost a tactical engagement but still lost their respective conflicts. Scipio and Grant saw the grand picture which was to win the war even if their battlefield strategies did not have the elegance of their opponents. You asked for a favorite general not favorite field commander and that I feel is a distinctive difference in qualifications. The former might be good for the short term but the essence of war is to win, not rack up style points in the conduct of your engagements. One can hardly dispute that Cannae, Trebia and Lake Trasimere are very elegant solutions to a tactical problem but as Hadrubal commented to Hannibal when he declined to follow up his lethal victory at Cannae with a direct siege of Rome " You know how to win a battle but not how to make use of it's fruits"

 

Scipio the Younger understood that destroying the base of Carthaginian logistics in Iberia and eventually Carthage itself would more surely win the war than meeting Hannibal in the field, that is qualitatively superior generalship aside from the fact that Zama was a very elegant tactical battle.

[OlafHelmsborg]

 

 

Scipio Africanus....he saw to the heart of the Punic Wars and did what no roman had been able to accomplish... crush Carthage once and for all which lead to Roman dominance of Europe for the next four centuries.

 

 

 

 

To be honest, Scipio wasn't the only one to crush Carthage's armies, they'd been doing that long before his arrival in Spain, and in Sicily, Sardinia, and against Hannibal's Lieutenants in Italy. Scipio arrived at the right time, and won some impressive victories, but the war had already been dragging for almost ten years before he took over, and the political situation already stretched in Spain. Carthage's manpower by that point was already reaching dire straights, and much of it was in open rebellion against Carthage, having only recently fallen under its sway a year or two before the Second Punic War began.

 

 

In the words of Adrian Goldsworthy:

 

It is difficult to see what more Hannibal could have done to attain victory. We can never know how close the Romans came to conceding defeat. Perhaps a march on Rome after Cannae would have broken the Roman's nerve, but we cannot be sure of this and such a move would have been a great gamble. One major problem for the Carthaginians was that they had one superb commander with an excellent army, whilst elsewhere they had poor commanders with average armies or average commanders with poor armies. From the beginning the Romans were able to produce in considerable quantity armies which were average in quality and the skill of their commanders, giving them an advantage over all but Hannibal. As the war progressed and Roman leaders and soldiers gained experience, their superiority over the other Punic armies became even more marked.

The Fall of Carthage by Adrian Goldsworthy, p.314

 

He was brilliant though, and is my second favorite commander.

 

A reasoned response deserves more than a quick refutation. Hannibal was an unmatched open field tactician but he lacked the grand tactical vision required to win the second Punic War. If he had followed up the battle of Cannae with the siege of Rome coupled with the destruction of the aqueducts as Aleric did in the fourth century he might have won the war. Hannibal spent sixteen years in Italy but never utilized the Carthaginian expertise in naval warfare and construction to strangle Roman logistics which also might have lead to eventual victory.

 

Hannibal much like Robert E Lee was a brilliant battlefield commander both of which almost never lost a tactical engagement but still lost their respective conflicts. Scipio and Grant saw the grand picture which was to win the war even if their battlefield strategies did not have the elegance of their opponents. You asked for a favorite general not favorite field commander and that I feel is a distinctive difference in qualifications. The former might be good for the short term but the essence of war is to win, not rack up style points in the conduct of your engagements. One can hardly dispute that Cannae, Trebia and Lake Trasimere are very elegant solutions to a tactical problem but as Hadrubal commented to Hannibal when he declined to follow up his lethal victory at Cannae with a direct siege of Rome " You know how to win a battle but not how to make use of it's fruits"

 

Scipio the Younger understood that destroying the base of Carthaginian logistics in Iberia and eventually Carthage itself would more surely win the war than meeting Hannibal in the field, that is qualitatively superior generalship aside from the fact that Zama was a very elegant tactical battle.

 

 

 

Thanks for your thoughtful response!

 

The aqueducts at this time were actually mostly underground (there were two of them, the Aqua Appia, and the Anio Vetus). He'd still have a devil of a time trying to starve Rome out without becoming besieged himself. As for Carthaginian naval expertise, it had already failed in the First Punic War, and Rome's was far larger and more experienced by Hannibal's time, which is one reason he took the land route to Italy. Rome dominated the seas, not Carthage.

 

(Sorry, I'm going to take this from my blog on a history site in regards to Hannibal not marching on Rome):

 

Being over 250 miles away, it would have taken three weeks for Hannibal to get there (not the 5 days suggested by Maharbal) which would have been ample time to shore up the cities defenses against Hannibal's weakened army (as suggested by Lancel, Lazenby, Shean, Daly and Goldsworthy). In the event of a protracted siege - the legions in the north, Sicily and elsewhere could have been called upon as relief forces (along with the freshly raised legions). Livy's words on the plight of Rome are rhetorical exaggerations. Rome had men to defend it's walls. Varro rallied his troops from Cannae, some 14,000 men who could have been put to use too.

 

Immediately after Cannae Hannibal sent a delegation led by Carthalo to negotiate a peace treaty with the Senate on moderate terms. It would have made little difference if he had been outside Rome, he was a few weeks march away regardless, yet despite the multiple catastrophes Rome had suffered, the Roman Senate refused to parley.

 

In Hans Delbruck's Warfare in Antiquity he says: At Cannae then, he had beaten and wiped out only the smaller half of the Roman Legions (8 of 18), and the Romans soon replaced their losses through new levies; they did not even have the legions stationed overseas - in Sicily, Sardinia, Spain - return home. To have moved against Rome immediately after the battle with a view toward the terrorizing effect would therefore have served no purpose for Hannibal and, passing as a negative demonstration, would have nullified the other morale effects of the victory at Cannae. If the well-known statement by the cavalry leader, Marharbal, that Hannibal understood how to win but not exploit his victories, was actually said, it only proves that the brave general who said it was a simple fighter rather than a true strategist. During the lengthy butchery of the encircled legionaries the Carthaginian army had itself sacrificed 5,700 killed, and consequently in addition at least 20,000 wounded, who were not capable of marching again until days and weeks had passed. Had he started out immediately after battle, Hannibal would have arrived before Rome with hardly 25,000 men, and the Romans would not have given in to such a small force, even at the height of their terror. (p.337)

 

And onto besieging Rome:

 

Rome was a very large, well-fortified city: the Servian wall had a circumference of more than five miles. Large open areas within the walls could accommodate refugees from the countryside. Rome was also a large trading capital, richly provided by supplies of all kinds. Hannibal would have had to control the sea and taken Ostia first so he himself could be supplied by sea to make besieging Rome not impossible with 50-60,000 men. But we know the Roman's had superiority at sea, which is why Hannibal had gathered his forces in a land army. According to Delbruck again:

 

The siege army would, therefore, have had to be supplied by land. Gigantic supply lines would have had to be organised and made to function through a completely hostile countryside and passing by innumerable cities and strongholds that blocked the routes. A very large portion of the Carthaginian force would have had to be assigned to this duty, and every isolated unit would have been exposed at every turn to the legions and cohorts, both Roman and allied, which were still stationed in the country or were newly organised. The remainder of the army which would have been available for siege, divided by the Tiber River, would have withstood only with great difficulty sorties of the numerically far superior garrison. The principal arm of the Carthaginians, their cavalry, could not have been of any assistance. (p.338)

 

With what forces Hannibal had at his disposal after Cannae, he clearly couldn't achieve the above.

 

Shean (in Hannibal's Mules) believes it was the consideration of supplying such a 250 mile march. Theoretically it was possible for pack animals to carry supplies to last for 19 days, and the number of animals would have been far too many available in his position, nor was a single region capable of providing fodder for the animals. If Hannibal had planned to attack Rome, he would have needed to march more than 15 miles a day to reach the wall in time and wanted a continuous march without foraging - for that they'd need 544,920 pack animals, and it was reckoned Hannibal had around 20,000 at any one time. Yes, his reason may well have been something as mundane as a lack of food!

 

As for Roman forces after Cannae:

 

Two city legions (an important distinction between the word legion here and Augustus' later Urban cohorts), 1500 men under Marcellus at Ostia, the legion of marines at Teanum Sidicinum, Postumius' two legions and allies in Cisalpine Gaul, and the armies in Sicily and Sardinia which could have been transferred across to Rome by sea before Hannibal's arrival. 8,000 slave volunteers and 6,000 criminals were quickly raised and armed with foreign armour and weapons from past triumphs to bolster the defences, not to mention the civilian population of Rome itself which would have also defended itself - had Hannibal somehow managed to get into the city, it has been argued by Strauss and Ober (The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and their lessons for Modern Strategists, 1992, p.154-5) that his army could have become involved in vicious street fighting which would have made it far from certain Hannibal could keep a hold on the city (especially considering that Hannibal would have arrived there with at most 25,000 men). Not to mention the 14,000 survivors Varro rallied after Cannae. Rome was far from undefended. Had they known they had nobody to defend themselves, why dismiss Cartharlo without even admitting him into the city to discuss peace - apparently Hannibal's terms were moderate? To suggest they would have capitulated at the sight of Hannibal's army is unknowable - but given the information I've read, I'm more inclined to believe they would have defended their city to the death.

 

They already had armies of sufficient size to defend the walls. The garrison of Rome has been worked out by Dodge to have been about 40,000 strong (Hannibal, p.387), almost twice as many men as Hannibal would have had if he left immediately after his victory at Cannae (the other half of his army wounded and unable to march the 250 miles to Rome, whilst he also lost 11 percent of his force, a staggeringly high casualty rate for a victor.) and that's not including Postumius's legions and those in Sardinia and Sicily which could have been quickly diverted to Rome by the use of the navy (and those in Spain if Hannibal had settled down for a long siege).

 

On a battlefield Hannibal's force would have the advantage, but even recruits could have put up a good defense on strong walls, much like Carthage's citizens did in the Third Punic war. Hannibal's veteran army in Spain struggled for 8 months against Saguntum, and they were mostly civilians without the backup of the legions Rome still had out in the field and allies to support her. Overall, my position on this is with the majority of modern scholarship, that he couldn't have taken the city directly after Cannae.

 

Whether or not he could have prevented supplies getting into Rome by river, Hannibal would have been surrounded by armies with his own supplies cut-off before Rome began to feel the effects of starvation.

 

Personally, I feel that had the Battle of Dertosa in 215 BC been won by his brother, and Hannibal had been reinforced by Hasdrubal and Mago's armies, then he could have perhaps made an attempt on Rome... but that wasn't to be.

 

In fact, very few cities in the war were taken by assault and the capture of fortified places has always been extremely difficult. According to Goldsworthy, 'as we have seen, direct attacks on a large city were only successful when they combined surprise with treachery from the inside or special knowledge of a weakness in the defences.' (p.313)

 

 

I think that O'Connell sums it up well in his book Ghosts of Cannae, that despite how shaken the inhabitants of Rome were, the senate remained clear-headed and made the leadership and personnel decisions to deal with the immediate crisis and to restore Rome's capacity to defend itself (its hard to judge which page it would be on the paperback, as I have an online version... which reads as p.525).

 

Gregory Daly in his book Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War says the Romans would have had ample time to prepare for the Carthaginian attack, for the city was well fortified, and there was no shortage of men to defend it (p.46)

 

Richard Gabriel says of it: There were two legiones urbanae raised at the beginning of the year and Marcellus' 1500 men at Ostia, the legion of marines that he had sent to Teanum Sidicinum, for nearly 17,000 men already under arms. In addition, all the able-bodied men of the city could have been pressed into service, including the slaves, some of whom were already armed (Hannibal, p.156). Lazenby says the same thing in Hannibal's War (pp.85-86). In Hannibal by Dodge he proves a list of figures - supposing the Romans could have had up to 40,000 men defending the walls (p.387)

 

Dexter Hoyos in Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean 247-183 BC says the above forces, but he makes some interesting points that these were not a complete answer, and that it is not certain Rome would be free of treachery citing other foreign residents who may not have been totally committed to Rome (p.120)

 

Carey (Hannibal's Last Battle: Zama and the Fall of Carthage) says the Romans had plenty of time to mount a spirited defence had Hannibal decided to march, and that Hannibal's army was certainly fatigued after the battle and not in any shape to not only make forced marches across the Apennines (which Hans Delbruck makes a point of in Warfare in Antiquity, p.337), but also to take the city, and the defences of Rome's capitol city was an entirely different order of magnitude to his previous sieges (pp.68-69). Tony Bath makes the same points in his book, Hannibal's Campaigns and says they were perfectly capable of defending themselves from a well-fortified city and had a huge reservoir of able-bodied citizens who could be armed and pressed into service (p.85).

 

Adrian Goldsworthy in his book The Fall of Carthage says: that a few men panicked and despaired should not surprise us; what is truly remarkable is that the majority remained so determined to fight on. He also then goes on to that they quickly recovered from the shock and took practical measures to rebuild their strength (pp.218-219).

 

They lost 177 members of the senate after Cannae, a lot of the middle generation and it should be stressed that two generations of future magistrates had been wiped out, leaving the helm firmly in the hands of the 'old guard', men who had been consuls way back in the 230s BC (and a group that directed affairs pretty much regularly down to 207 BC). Could this much reduced senate really convince people to fight who didn't actually want to, especially considering the recent disasters? How would the people react to them had they known they refused to even speak to the Carthaginians bringing terms of peace? (Vishnia, 2011, State, Society and Popular Leaders in Mid-Republican Rome 241-167 BC). It appears they were willing to continue the fight regardless of the mistakes made after only a brief period of despondency...

 

Hannibal then, in my opinion, made a logical choice to begin to weaken Rome by playing on the morale affects of Cannae, perhaps in order to strike at Rome when he had his own supply lines secured and his reinforcements. Sadly, results in other theatres and the military response of Rome on the peninsular turned Hannibal's war into one of attrition. And even then he brought Rome to the brink of economic ruin.

 

 

 

Compared to Scipio, i tend to agree with Lazenby's analysis:

 

As strategists too, both men were clear-sighted and bold, but it is astonishing that anyone should rate Scipio higher in this respect, for although his strategy in Spain was skillful and successful, the problems he faced there were as nothing compared to the problems Hannibal had to face in Italy: Scipio' task, essentially, was to defeat the forces of an alien power, and he could rely on the actual or potential support of most of the indigenous population, once he had won some successes. But Hannibal not only had to contend with the immense manpower resources of the Roman commonwealth itself, but had to win over a population all of which had been under Roman control for some two generations, and much of which no longer regarded the Romans as alien in the sense that he and his soldiers were. As for Scipio's invasion of Africa, it appears obvious and pedestrian compared to Hannibal's breathtaking boldness in invading Italy: the Roman's had, after all, already invaded Africa during the First Punic War, and it had been their original plan in 218, as Polybius makes clear (3.40.2), but no one, least of all the Romans, had imagined that the war could be carried into Italy. Scipio's slowness in implementing his plan is also in marked contrast to Hannibal's speed: assuming that Scipio eventually landed in Africa in the late spring or early summer of 204, he had already been planning the invasion for over a year, and it took him nearly another year even to break out of his original bridgehead to win the battle of the Great plains, whereas within just over two years of his departure from Cartagena, Hannibal had marched thousands of kilometres, to carry the war into the heart of enemy territory, had shattered three Roman armies, and was on the point of overrunning much of Southern Italy. Again, the success of Scipio's strategy in Spain and Africa as compared to the ultimate failure of Hannibal's in Italy, is not the only criterion one should adopt in assessing their relative merits as strategists: no other strategy could have brought Carthage as near success, and it is this that is the measure of Hannibal's quality, not his ultimate failure.

Nothing, finally, Scipio ever did can compare with Hannibal's ability to maintain himself in a hostile land for fifteen years, faced with overwhelming resources in manpower. (Hannibal's War, pp.226-7)

 

When you're in other theaters, you need to rely on your other generals. Scipio and the Republic were better suited for war, and he had the backup of an extremely competent veritable war cabinet that made few mistakes after the first few years, whereas everything Carthage did other than Hannibal was slow and labored. Even after four victories over the Romans and Italians (at Ticinus, Victumulae, Trebia and Trasimene) not one single ally on the Italian Peninsular joined Hannibal. The culture of the tribes in Spain dictated how they would react to such victories, and the Carthaginians lost most of their allies after a few victories by Scipio. Hannibal had no such luck, and had to continue to support himself for three years without a home base which speaks volumes on his abilities as a general. Sadly, all the other forces and commanders for Carthage were poor.

 

Roman armies were more homogenous than the various mixed nationalities of Carthaginian ones, hence the command structure would have been a lot better. Hannibal and his officers had a wonderful relationship with the soldiers, with great organization and discipline which is what made his army excellent.

 

Perhaps he overestimated the abilities of his generals like his brother Hasdrubal, but then perhaps he had no choice and a Barcid family member had to remain in charge to retain the loyalty of the tribes. Hasdrubal Gisgo was determined but ultimately useless and probably only there as a political ally and had no choice but to appoint him as a general! I mean, there was only a certain area that could have been of any use in a campaigning season. Had Carthage generals in Spain not engaged in a direct battle, Scipio would have found it very hard going trying to get into the interior of Spain - with little food and would have been forced to remain on the coast to acquire supplies. But nope, their general strategy there was to be away from the key city of the region which was garrisoned by only 1000 men (New Carthage) and to be no where near the Roman enemy. I could understand them being split to relieve logistical considerations... but the generals in Spain really didn't help much. A letter written by Scipio Africanus himself to Philip of Macedon on the capture of New Carthage even revealed that the three generals in Spain were at loggerheads, and practically hated each other, which did not help the Carthaginian strategy in Spain at all. Hannibal prevented the invasion of Africa, which was a good start. However, I believe it may have been a mistake to have left the Scipio's access to march onto Spain - but perhaps he had hoped they would follow him to Italy or that his brother with the resources at hand would beat them... Sicily was subdued due to general misfortune of the Carthaginian army there dying from an epidemic (not in Hannibal's control). Plus, it was also betrayed by a small faction of discontents within the city (also not in Hannibal's control). There was also the betrayal of one of Hannibal's officers who was an integral part of winning over the island in Muttines, who fell out with the Carthaginian officers in Sicily due to his successes. The betrayal of such important officers in the Roman army would be unthinkable. Large parts of Sicily, particularly after Marcellus' grim tactics seemed to mainly side with Carthage. Sadly once the army was decimated by disease and Syracuse in the hands of the Romans, there was little Carthage could do.

 

Hannibal's strategy was the only one available, and he was correct in bringing the war to Italy, it was the only way to win. What other options was there? The war wouldn't be won simply fighting in Spain. Had he stayed in Spain, both Africa and Spain were targets for invasion (which we know from the sources) and which Hannibal prepared for, and we know how well other Carthaginian generals did, and it may not change the outcome of the war. Staying in Spain and Africa would not be striking at Rome, and the only way to do it was by invading. In fact, Lazenby has suggested it was the idea of a long drawn out war on their doorstep which would eventually bring the Roman's to negotiate, with his Generals in Spain told to hold the line and not let the Romans in (which they sort of did for some years!) Had he stayed and beaten Roman armies in Spain or Africa, the only thing that would achieve would be a momentary peace, and who knew how long that would last? The other option is not going to war, but then that's taking the statement that Hannibal alone was responsible for it at face value, and I for one (not to mention Polybius), believe the Romans were pretty much opportunistic in their dealings with the Marmetines to start the first war, their capture of Sardinia, and they certainly played their part in starting the second. In fact it's quite possible that Rome made a treaty with Saguntum to escalate the trouble into conflict, one in which no Roman believed would be fought in Italy.

 

Strategically speaking it was a great design, and as late as 209 BC Italy was still in trouble with 12 of the thirty Latin colonies refusing to supply troops, whilst according to Livy many other allies were equally disgruntled. Hannibal sadly wasn't backed up by decent generals, pretty much every other pitched battle fought in the war was a Carthaginian loss regardless of say facing Scipio Africanus. In fact, had a few things favoured Carthage it may have helped aid Hannibal's strategy, but he can't be blamed for the loss of Sicily (he had chosen two great agents which had convinced Syracuse to join Hannibal) for the army there was decimated by an epidemic - whilst the Battle of Dertosa in 215 BC won by the Scipio brothers against Hasdrubal Barca's army he was bringing to Italy really dealt Hannibal's efforts a terrible blow. Not only did he lose a large contingent of men coming to support him from Spain, but massive reinforcements from Africa were sent to replace those men lost to the Scipios to defend Spain.

 

Essentially, this victory prevented Carthage using up to four armies in Italy. Hasdrubal in the north would have applied pressure on the allies there, while Hannibal would have had new troops to defend his allies better while allowing him to take back the initiative lost due to not being able to be in two or more places at once, while Spain would have been fairly secure as the Romans may well have been concerned with the large Carthaginian forces in Italy.

 

At such a critical time, with Rome on the back foot after Cannae, this could well have been what Hannibal needed to win the war... but of course, some things were not in Hannibal's control.Yes, Carthage lost, and some of the blame falls squarly on Hannibal's shoulders, but his strategy was a sound one.

 

To be honest, if he was a poor strategist, the war wouldn't have lasted the better part of two decades. That it was a failure there is no doubt, but in the words of Lazenby:

 

but when after seven years a strategy has resulted in the defection of the two largest cities in the enemy's country, after the capital itself, along with over 40% percent of her allies, and when the enemy army has been comprehensibly defeated three times, on the last occasion perhaps suffering worse casualties, in a single day of fighting, than any other army in European history, it can hardly be regarded as a 'complete failure'. (Was Maharbal Right?, p.47 in The Second Punic War A Reappraisal, ed Cornell)

 

He continued to win field victories also

 

In 212 BC came First Herdonia, which, if historical - and it is difficult to account for the charge of perduellio allegedly brought against the Roman commander, if it is not - cost the Romans 16,000 casualties. In 210 came Second Herdonia, which cost the Roman commander and eleven of his twelve military tribunes their lives, as well as those of either 13,000 or 7000 of their men. Also in 210 came Numistro, which Livy regards as a Roman victory but Frontinus as a defeat. In 209 Marcellus was twice defeated in Canusium, and, finally, in 208 although it was of no ultimate importance, both consuls, Marcellus and Crispinus, recieved mortal wounds in an ambush. (The Second Punic War A Reappraisal, ed Cornell, John Lazeny, Was Maharbal Right?, p.46) That's not to mention his swift movements to defeat other armies though admittedly smaller ones of about a legion on several occasions, and the battle of Silarus river where he destroyed a fuirther Roman force of 15,000 men. Not only did 12 of 30 Latin colonies no longer had the men and goods to supply Rome, but other areas like Etruria were wavering and required swift action from the senate to take hostages from the major city there.

 

Rome was suffering badly, but had the armies and commanders to send to other theaters who were above the skill of the armies and commanders of Carthage, all but Hannibal and his excellent army, and we know Hannibal could not be everywhere at once. What doomed Carthage was the fortunes of war, not Hannibal's strategy, which was really the only viable one for victory and one in which he may have came agonizingly close to succeeding. People seem to think Scipio's campaigns were near perfect, but on closer inspection, he also made plenty of errors, errors which weren't punished by the slow reactions of the Carthaginians. Had the Carthaginian navy not dallied by waiting a whole day in a bay after leaving Carthage to attack Scipio's fleet which had been converted to siege engines thus were incapable of fighting a naval action he would have been in dire straights, but their slowness allowed Scipio time to return and save his fleet and campaign. Scipio also failed to capture cities in Africa, spending two years and many failed attempts trying to capture Utica (there he didn't have the information of a weakness in defense or a small garrison to contend with like his success at New Carthage - which goes to show how difficult assaulting and capturing cities really was).

 

Hannibal's acquisition of the south gave him access to allies that would supply him and maintain the struggle - it also gave him access to valuable ports so that more forces could reach him via Africa. Some people think he had hopeless aspects of receiving support, yet several armies were raised by his allies and his officers on the peninsular, but they were also defeated by Roman armies, or sadly, operated under their own initiative, heedless of the words of Hannibal.

 

However, with targets to attack, Rome could go on the initiative. They no longer had to react to Hannibal's movements.

 

Carthage could have reinforced him a number of times, and their navy was quite capable of moving large forces from one place to another:

 

These are some of the reinforcements by way of the Carthaginian navy, made throughout the war:

 

Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian commander, did not feel himself strong enough in either arm, and kept himself safe by taking up strong positions at a distance from the enemy; until, in response to his many earnest appeals for reinforcements, 4000 infantry and 1000 cavalry were sent to him from Africa. Then, recovering his confidence, he moved nearer the enemy, and gave orders for the fleet to be put into readiness to protect the islands and the coast. (23.26)

 

In the meanwhile the news was brought to Carthage that things had gone badly in Spain and that almost all the communities in that country had gone over to Rome. Mago, Hannibal's brother, was preparing to transport to Italy a force of 12,000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and 20 elephants, escorted by a fleet of 60 warships. On the receipt of this news, however, some were in favour of Mago, with such a fleet and army as he had, going to Spain instead of Italy, but whilst they were deliberating there was a sudden gleam of hope that Sardinia might be recovered. They were told that "there was only a small Roman army there, the old praetor, A. Cornelius, who knew the province well, was leaving and a fresh one was expected; the Sardinians, too, were tired of their long subjection, and during the last twelve months the government had been harsh and rapacious and had crushed them with a heavy tax and an unfair exaction of corn. Nothing was wanting but a leader to head their revolt. "This report was brought by some secret agents from their leaders, the prime mover in the matter being Hampsicora, the most influential and wealthy man amongst them at that time. Perturbed by the news from Spain, and at the same time elated by the Sardinian report, they sent Mago with his fleet and army to Spain and selected Hasdrubal to conduct the operations in Sardinia, assigning to him a force about as large as the one they had furnished to Mago. (23.32)

 

The army sent to Sardinia was defeated there (Livy, 23.40) and shortly afterwards, a naval battle took place in which Hasdrubal was defeated by Titus Otacilius Crassus (23.41) as Hasdrubal was returning to Africa.

 

Very few were influenced by Hanno's speech. His well-known dislike of the Barcas deprived his words of weight and they were too much preoccupied with the delightful news they had just heard to listen to anything which would make them feel less cause for joy. They fancied that if they were willing to make a slight effort the war would soon be over. A resolution was accordingly passed with great enthusiasm to reinforce Hannibal with 4000 Numidians, 40 elephants, and 500 talents of silver. (23.13)

 

But they did not remain quiet long, for just after this battle an order was received from Carthage for Hasdrubal to lead his army as soon as he could into Italy. This became generally known throughout Spain and the result was that there was a universal feeling in favour of Rome. Hasdrubal at once sent a despatch to Carthage pointing out what mischief the mere rumour of his departure had caused, and also that if he did really leave Spain it would pass into the hands of the Romans before he crossed the Ebro. He went on to say that not only had he neither a force nor a general to leave in his place, but the Roman generals were men whom he found it difficult to oppose even when his strength was equal to theirs. If, therefore, they were at all anxious to retain Spain they should send a man with a powerful army to succeed him, and even though all went well with his successor he would not find it an easy province to govern. (23.27) (this passage is relevant to understand the one below)

 

Although this despatch made a great impression on the senate, they decided that as Italy demanded their first and closest attention, the arrangements about Hannibal and his forces must not be altered. Himilco was sent with a large and well-appointed army and an augmented fleet to hold and defend Spain by sea and land. As soon as he had brought his military and naval forces across he formed an entrenched camp, hauled his ships up on the beach and surrounded them with a rampart. After providing for the safety of his force he started with a picked body of cavalry, and marching as rapidly as possible, and being equally on the alert whether passing through doubtful or through hostile tribes, succeeded in reaching Hasdrubal. After laying before him the resolutions and instructions of the senate and being in his turn shown in what way the war was to be managed in Spain, he returned to his camp. (23.28)

 

Himilco, who had been for a considerable time cruising with his fleet off the promontory of Pachynus, returned to Carthage as soon as he heard that Syracuse had been seized by Hippocrates. Supported by the envoys from Hippocrates and by a despatch from Hannibal in which he said that the time had arrived for winning back Sicily in the most glorious way, and by the weight of his own personal presence, he had no difficulty in persuading the government to send to Sicily as large a force as they could of both infantry and cavalry. Sailing back to the island he landed at Heraclea an army of 20,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and twelve elephants, a very much stronger force than he had with him at Pachynus (24.35)

 

After Marcellus' departure from Sicily a Carthaginian fleet landed a force of 8000 infantry and 3000 Numidian horse. (26.21)

 

In regards to strengthening Hannibal's brother Mago's position in northern Italy:

 

To Mago they sent not only instructions but also 25 warships, a force of 6000 infantry, 800 cavalry and 7 elephants. A large amount of money was also forwarded to him to enable him to raise a body of mercenaries, with which he might be able to move nearer Rome and form a junction with Hannibal. Such were the preparations and plans of Carthage. (29.4)

 

 

Sadly, Hannibal could not be present in every battle, and lost many of his potential soldiers through Carthage making other strategical decisions based on a number of decisions (loss of forces in Spain, opportunity in Sardinia etc) or simply losing them in battles he wasn't in command on the peninsular.

 

Hannibal was far from a strategic irrelevancy on the peninsular- throughout the majority of the war, the main theater of war for the Romans was, first and foremost, the Italian peninsular, and even when he was pushed back into the south, had his other generals won in Africa or Spain, the Romans may well have sought more adequate terms of peace. Bruttium's geography was well-suited for the sort of guerrilla tactics Hannibal employed in his later years, and he would have been very hard to shift from that position.

 

Again, I'd like to reference Adrian Goldsworthy:

 

It is difficult to see what more Hannibal could have done to attain victory. We can never know how close the Romans came to conceding defeat. Perhaps a march on Rome after Cannae would have broken the Roman's nerve, but we cannot be sure of this and such a move would have been a great gamble. One major problem for the Carthaginians was that they had one superb commander with an excellent army, whilst elsewhere they had poor commanders with average armies or average commanders with poor armies. From the beginning the Romans were able to produce in considerable quantity armies which were average in quality and the skill of their commanders, giving them an advantage over all but Hannibal. As the war progressed and Roman leaders and soldiers gained experience, their superiority over the other Punic armies became even more marked.

The Fall of Carthage by Adrian Goldsworthy, p.314

 

Scipio was a superb commander - but his campaigns in Spain and Africa wasn't quite like attacking Rome and her allies. Carthage's position in Spain was always tenuous and certainly less solid than the relationship Rome had with lots of her allies (something Rome would find out afterwards - it would take nearly two-hundred years to subdue Spain), even during the siege of Saguntum Hannibal had to leave Maharbal in charge to go deal with the Tagus barbarians, and throughout the campaigns one reason why the armies were spread out was the fact that they were trying to sort out uprisings amongst the Spanish. They simply didn't have the manpower to contend with that and the legions like the Romans did in Italy. Even their most important ally Syphax was contemplating joining Rome before Rome had invaded Africa, and had in fact, betrayed Carthage before, requiring Masinissa to beat him on Carthage's behalf... which reveals how tenuous their relationship was with even the closest of allies. The armies he faced in Spain and Africa were worse than anything Hannibal faced in Italy whose general's and armies proved to be defeated by Roman armies led by any Roman commander (not just Scipio).

 

The Senate's handling of the war was superb, and from 211 onwards, it is hard to find much fault with anything they did. Scipio's invasion of Africa is often credited to Scipio's strategic genius... but it was, ultimately sanctioned by the Senate and was no more than a reversion to the strategy originally adopted by that body in 218.

 

As for Zama, first, lets investigate their forces:

 

Hannibal's infantry were set up in three lines, each line generally agreed to have been made up of 12,000 men for a total of 36,000 infantry and 2000 Carthaginian citizen cavalry.

 

The Numidian Prince Tychaeus brought 2000 cavalry.

 

A force of 80 elephants (which has been doubted by Richard Gabriel who suggests as it takes up to 20 years to train war elephants to a sufficient standard, the Carthaginians had already used up their best in the war already. De Sanctis and Gabriel believe there was more likely only about 20 young and inexperienced elephants in Hannibal's army)

 

Total Strength: 40,000 (though Appian says 50,000, but this is generally rejected by modern historians)

 

Deployment: Hannibal drew up his infantry in 3 lines, each 12,000 strong (though it's possible his third line of veterans was made up of more, perhaps some 15,000 men). The first line were mercenaries: Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders and Moors, and had been raised by Mago (who had died returning from Italy in 203 BC). In front of this line were light armed skirmishers and 80 elephants. At a certain distance behind the first line, the second consisted of native Libyans and Carthaginians. They were given orders not to support the first line, but to follow behind and keep their distance. The third line was at a greater distance from the second, more than a furlong, and were Hannibal's Old Guard, his veterans from Italy, thought to have been made up of mostly Bruttians, but no doubt some of the old survivors who had marched with him from Spain too, who would have been in their 40s at least by now. They were to act as an independent reserve, and halted when the first two lines advanced, creating an even bigger gap between them. Hannibal posted his cavalry on the wings, with the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right.

 

Scipio's Forces and Deployment:

 

There are no solid figures for the size of Scipio's army, but it is usually reckoned to have been made up of about 30,000 infantry (including 6,000 Numidians) and over 6,100 cavalry (1,500 Roman and Italian, 4,600 Numidian)

 

Total Strength: 36,100

 

Deployment: Scipio deployed his troops in the usual three line formation – but instead of the principes covering the gaps of the hastati maniples, they were set up directly behind them, the triarii forming the final line. The intervals between the front maniples were filled with companies of velites. This created lanes, which he hid from Hannibal with the velites. Laelius' Italian horse was on the left wing, and Masinissa and all his Numidians on the right. (the Numdian infantry are fought to have either been placed with the velites, on the flanks of the Roman legionaries, or mixed in with the Numidian horse. I believe they were most likely mixed in with the velites, sadly it is impossible to determine.

 

 

Two thirds of Hannibal's infantry force were unreliable, a third completely freshly levied, only the third line made up of his veterans of Italy were an instrument of Hannibal's will. The rest were made up of disparate armies that had yet to gel. Scipio's infantry were a homogenous force and very experienced, made up of veterans who had seen constant service since at least 216 BC (made up of the remnants of Cannae, and the two battles of Herdonia, who continued to fight and campaign in Sicily and then in Africa) - Scipio's infantry had the advantage overall - not in numbers, but in organization and overall experience.

 

Hannibal is also thought to have devised a plan to level the playing field in regards to the cavalry. Both H.H Scullard and Richard Gabriel believe Hannibal gave them the order to give ground and drive the opposition off the field, which could explain the ease of the Roman victory here (though against this they may well have just perused too far, and Lazenby believes that it would have been very risky to expose his flanks like this). With the cavalry off the field, Hannibal's only chance of victory would be to break the Roman centre, thus he threw all his weight against the numerically inferior Romans, starting with the elephants, then three waves of infantry. The strategy almost worked, as we can see the hastati were exhausted after their struggles against the first two lines. It is also thought that Hannibal set up the third line to prevent Scipio's infantry flanking his first two lines,.

 

Scipio's own tactics were the set up of his maniples and the use of the lanes to funnel the elephants, and the extension of his line to engage Hannibal's veterans. Scipio's tactics relied on turning the phalanx into echelon, which he did by discarding the usual quincunx formation by placing the triarii and principes back from the front line making the last two lines capable of independent manoeuvre, which Hannibal nullified completely with the use of his third line, thus Scipio engaged in the normal Roman frontal slog rather than use his manoeuvres from earlier battles. Hannibal's third line also is considered the first true reserve in history. Gabriel believes out of the two plans, Hannibal's was the most sophisticated (Gabriel, p.199)

 

Scipio's legions were superior infantry and cavalry wise, disciplined to the degree that they responded very quickly and efficiently to re-calls and re-distributions. But they were stopped in their tracks by Hannibal and his veterans. (Thanks SpartanJKM!)

 

Strategically before the battle, both were considering the same objective, to reach their allies from the west (mainly for cavalry support); Scipio was searching for Massinissa, Hannibal for Vermina and both generals moved their armies towards them. It was a risk on both their parts as they had no control over it, but perhaps Scipio had more reliable information where Massinissa was. Massinissa arrived first at any rate. Vermina arrived just a few days too late to help Hannibal, and was bringing a large force to compliment the Carthaginian which Livy puts at 16,200 men. Livy's date that the battle against Vermina happened three months after Zama makes no sense as Vermina would not sally forth to Zama to fight Scipio's army unless he was there to support Hannibal.

 

 

The story of Hannibal being too far from water also appears suspicious. According to Gabriel (p.191):

 

 

Why Hannibal would have made such a basic mistake in not providing water for his army and animals in the obviously hot and dry climate is not explained...

 

It's interesting to wonder what just may have happened had Hannibal linked up with Vermina's force in time...

 

 

Please don't mistake my intentions, as I said before, Scipio is great, and my second favorite general. I just don't think the evidence we have points to him being better than Hannibal. There were far too many variables in their campaigns to make that judgement. Hannibal's task was a lot tougher. Scipio had the upper hand in the Zama campaign, but then he hadn't been in sole command of an army, along with the stress that brings, for as long as Hannibal (Hannibal had been in command for just shy of 20 years of non-stop campaigning as leader, and probably a further ten years as an officer fighting under his father and brother in law!) When they did finally meet, Scipio had the advantages of a seasoned army that had worked together for a long time, with the momentum Rome's way, whilst Hannibal had a hodgepodge army (and almost won with it!). Things would have been very different had Hannibal met Scipio with his army from Cannae...

 

Anyhow, even if this post doesn't change your mind, I hope you take something from it! :)

Edited May 3, 2014 by OlafHelmsborg

[kvnchrist]

I liked Patton. A no-nonsense, git'r'done general. He may have had his personality flaws, but, all in all, a great commander.

 

Patton for me too. The guy had his issues, but he had the right mindset to get the job done. War is insanity and needs to be over as quickly as possible. Eisenhower played politics with war and most likely extended it further than it should lasted. For his diplomacy he got the white house, when Patton received a grave stone.

 

I wonder If we'd have fought a cold war and be facing Putin if Patton would have lived and more important, would have been listened too.

 

War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.

Read more at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/w/william_tecumseh_sherman.html#T6lFOJJQllZ6m10y.99

[HeyYou]

 

I liked Patton. A no-nonsense, git'r'done general. He may have had his personality flaws, but, all in all, a great commander.

 

Patton for me too. The guy had his issues, but he had the right mindset to get the job done. War is insanity and needs to be over as quickly as possible. Eisenhower played politics with war and most likely extended it further than it should lasted. For his diplomacy he got the white house, when Patton received a grave stone.

 

I wonder If we'd have fought a cold war and be facing Putin if Patton would have lived and more important, would have been listened too.

 

War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.

Read more at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/w/william_tecumseh_sherman.html#T6lFOJJQllZ6m10y.99

 

Interesting point. Patton was all for going into Russia, as he could see what the future held. Don't think we would have been any more successful than the Germans though..... at least, without resorting to nuclear weapons.....

[kvnchrist]

 

 

I liked Patton. A no-nonsense, git'r'done general. He may have had his personality flaws, but, all in all, a great commander.

 

Patton for me too. The guy had his issues, but he had the right mindset to get the job done. War is insanity and needs to be over as quickly as possible. Eisenhower played politics with war and most likely extended it further than it should lasted. For his diplomacy he got the white house, when Patton received a grave stone.

 

I wonder If we'd have fought a cold war and be facing Putin if Patton would have lived and more important, would have been listened too.

 

War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.

Read more at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/w/william_tecumseh_sherman.html#T6lFOJJQllZ6m10y.99

 

Interesting point. Patton was all for going into Russia, as he could see what the future held. Don't think we would have been any more successful than the Germans though..... at least, without resorting to nuclear weapons.....

 

 

The one thing that I can see is the war fatigue that the country was in. That and the war hype of the Russian's being our friends and the German's being so evil. The holocaust would have ended any chance of the U.S. going in anywhere with Germany.

 

You know what the irony of all this is? The German's gave free passage through Germany to Lenin during WWI and it came back to bite them.